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I. Introduction
Countries around the world, in the interest of their citizens,
have developed methods of mitigating the instances of double
taxation. One method is through tax conventions (treaties) that the
contracting nations negotiate and that contain rules on who can tax
what.
Inevitably, disputes arise when taxpayers claim double taxation
not in accordance with a convention. To deal with these claims, tax
conventions include a Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) where
government designated competent authorities from each nation meet
and agree on a course of action to alleviate that particular taxpayer's
instance of double taxation. In the United States, the competent
authority is the Internal Revenue Service.
As the number of cases submitted to MAP increased, problems
were exposed in the MAP process. The three common problems
were: (1) the length of time it took competent authorities to agree;
(2) competent authorities did not always reach a decision; and (3)
taxpayers were not involved in the process.
The first two problems have been best addressed by the recent
inclusion of mandatory binding arbitration provisions within MAP.
In the United States, however, only four out of over sixty tax
conventions include mandatory binding arbitration provisions.
Inconsistent arbitration standards exist across the remaining
negotiated and model tax conventions.
The third problem, lack of taxpayer involvement, has yet to be
resolved. As this paper suggests, several international commercial
arbitration standards should be applied in tax arbitration. Party
involvement in commercial arbitration disputes is a key element of
its widespread use and success at dispute resolution. It follows that
taxpayer involvement in international tax arbitration proceedings
will have a similar effect.
Most MAP arbitration provisions in tax conventions were
developed for the sole purpose of "fixing" MAP so there would be
fewer instances of double taxation. The problems with MAP,
however, reflect concerns over time management, agreement between
competent authorities, and lack of taxpayer involvement. When
viewed in the context of these interests, tax arbitration development
seems to parallel some of the goals of international commercial
arbitration.
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The drafters of arbitration clauses in international tax conentions
will benefit by looking to the established international commercial
arbitration (ICA) system for guidance. By examining the four United
States mandatory binding arbitration provisions in the context of
important ICA issues, the weaknesses of the current international tax
arbitration (ITA)1 system can be improved. A better system means
fewer instances of double taxation, more taxpayer activity in the
global market, and more overall tax revenue for government use.
The inclusion of arbitration provisions in international tax
treaties should be considered not just as a MAP fix, but as a separate
dispute resolution mechanism. Inclusion of these provisions shows
the extension of the private sector's arbitration success into a
government dominated area. In fact, this is the natural result of an
ongoing progression from private party-private party arbitration
(ICA), to state-nationals of other states (ICSID arbitration), to state-
state arbitration (ITA). This paper suggests that a three party
system of state-state-taxpayer arbitration is the best way to carry out
disputes under international tax conventions.
II. International Tax Issues
A. Double Taxation
The United States taxes residents on their worldwide income,
meaning "all income from whatever source derived." 2  Other
countries "impose similar residence-based income taxation on
residents and source-based income taxation on foreigners."3 When a
taxpayer's income is subject to tax in both the United States and
another country, there is a risk of double taxation. This "overlap" of
multiple tax systems risks "discouraging international business and
investment pursuits." 4 Countries are trying to solve this problem by
negotiating new tax conventions.
1. In this paper I will refer to mandatory binding international tax arbitration
in the context of MAP as "ITA."
2. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2013).
3. Allison Christians, Your Own Personal Tax Law: Dispute Resolution Under the
OECD Model Tax Convention, 17 WILLAMETrE J. INT'L L. & Dis. REs. 172, 174 (2009).
4. Id.
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B. Tax Conventions
Tax conventions "are bilateral treaties that are negotiated directly
between two countries." 5 The conventions seek "to alleviate some of
the double taxation issues by defining terms, allocating income, and
setting up objective tests for certain jurisdictional issues."6  Tax
conventions incorporate "specific provisions to provide individuals
and companies with greater certainty regarding their tax liability and
to reduce the risk of double or excessive taxation." 7 They "serve
various economic and political purposes as well"8 because the
conventions represent negotiations between countries about how they
will treat foreign enterprises. For a taxpayer, however, a "tax treaty is
not worth much unless the treaty also contains provisions for the
elimination of double taxation when there is a conflict between the
two states as to the taxability of a certain item of income."9 States
currently include Mutual Agreement Procedures (MAP) in their tax
conventions to handle these conflicts.
C. Mutual Agreement Procedure in Tax Conventions
A common tax convention provision that deals with these
conflicts is the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP). MAP is included
in many tax conventions, and is generally voluntary and nonbinding.1o
MAP "allows a taxpayer who is disturbed by an apparent
misapplication of a tax treaty by one of the treaty signatory countries
to request a designated bureaucrat - called a competent authority -
to engage in efforts to resolve the problem directly with the counter
5. Michael S. Kirsch, The Limits of Administrative Guidance in the Interpretation of
Tax Treaties, 87 TEx. L. REV. 1063, 1065 (2008-2009).
6. MICHELLE S. BERTOLINI & PAMELA Q. WEAVER, MANDATORY ARBITRATION
WITHIN TAX TREATIES: A NEED FOR A COHERENT INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 2
(February 2012), 2012 American Taxation Association Midyear Meeting: JLTR
Conference, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2003897.
7. John Harrington, No Dispute About the Increasing Importance of Arbitration in
Tax Treaties, 59 TAX NOTES INT'L 753, 753 (2010).
8. Jeanne N. Covington, Dispute Resolution Under Tax Treaties: Current and
Proposed Methods, 24 TEx. INT'L L.J. 367, 371 (1989).
9. BERTOLINI & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 2.
10. See, e.g., The Convention Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the United Mexican States for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on
Income, Together with a Related Protocol, U.S.-Mex., art. 26 (Mutual Agreement
Procedure), Sept. 18, 1992, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
trty/mexico.pdf.
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party's designated competent authority."It The competent authorities
then meet as national representatives from each contracting country to
try to reach an agreement on the appropriate tax treatment of the
taxpayer.
D. Limitations of MAP
1. MAP Agreement Can Take a Long Time
MAP provisions do not establish time limits under which
competent authorities must reach a decision. Consequently, there is
no incentive for authorities to come to a timely agreement. This
"failure of the international tax system to resolve double taxation
issues within reasonable time frames not only imposes economic
costs directly on both business and governments, but also tends to
diminish confidence within the business community in the ability of
the international economic system to resolve even routine
intergovernmental issues."12 IRS data show that from 1995 through
2004, the time it took to resolve a conflict through MAP increased
from 20 to 30 months.13 European data show during the 1990s, MAP
resolution took an average of 18 months, and sometimes took up to
two years.14 The OECD's most recent statistics show that in 2010 it
took 27.3 months on average to complete MAP between OECD
countries.15
2. Competent Authorities Do Not Have To Reach a Decision
Currently, MAP provisions contain a major flaw, as they do not
require competent authorities to agree on any final resolution.
Sometimes competent authorities "become entrenched in
inconsistent positions that each genuinely believes to be superior."16
Before arbitration was introduced into MAP, as discussed below,
11. Christians, supra note 3, at 172.
12. MICHAEL C. DURST & ROBERT E. CULBERTSON, ARBITRATION To RESOLVE
DIFFICULT DOUBLE TAXATION DISPUTES: THE U.S. AND ITS TRADING PARTNERS SHOULD
SEIZE THE MOMENT 2 (King & Spalding Publications, 2000), available at
http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/library/pdf/culbertsontax.pdf.
13. BERTOLINI & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 13.
14. Id.
15. OECD Dispute Resolution, Country Mutual Agreement Procedure Statistics
for 2010, OECD, available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/disputeresolution/
disputeresolutioncountrymutualagreementprocedurestatisticsfor20l0.htm (last
visited Dec. 17, 2012).
16. DURST & CULBERTSON, supra note 12, at 4.
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there was no incentive for competent authorities to agree, thereby
resolving the dispute and finishing MAP. In fact, data from the
United States Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) show
out of all the claims submitted to MAP, "a wide range of taxpayer
income . . . received partial or no relief"'7 because the competent
authorities did not reach a conclusion. The most recent statistics
from the OECD show 3,328 open MAP cases at the end of 2010, a
41.5% increase from 2006.18 This "empirical evidence shows that the
current MAP procedures [without arbitration clauses] are not
accomplishing their goal of removing double taxation based upon
tax treaty provisions."19
3. Taxpayers Are Not Involved
Currently, a taxpayer who protests double taxation surrenders
his claim to his state's competent authorities to argue on his behalf in
the MAP proceedings. After MAP begins, the "affected taxpayers are
normally excluded from the competent authority deliberations or, in
any event, have no official or guaranteed status in such
deliberations." 20  Some tax scholars find it "unreasonable and
unnecessary" that the taxpayer, "despite being the principal
stakeholder and at risk to double taxation, has no official means of
direct participation."21 Additionally, taxpayers don't always trust
their competent authority to represent their interests behind closed
doors. For example, the competent authority of the United States is
the IRS whom many taxpayers see as an adversary. 22 Current
mandatory binding arbitration clauses do not give the taxpayer a
central role in the resolution of his own tax issue. When writing
future arbitration clauses into tax conventions, states should look to
the high degree of party involvement in the international commercial
arbitration dispute resolution structure and give the taxpayer a bigger
17. BERTOLINI & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 15.
18. OECD Dispute Resolution, supra note 15.
19. BERTOLINI & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 15.
20. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (ICC), ARBITRATION IN
INTERNATIONAL TAX MATTERS, PoucY STATEMENT 1 (3 May 2000), available at
www.iccwbo.org/Data/Policies/2000/Arbitration-in-international-tax-matters/.
21. James P. Fuller & Barton W.S. Bassett, International Tax Controversies: The
United States Introduces Mandatory Arbitration for Resolving Certain Treaty Disputes, 34
INT'L TAX J. 15, 16 (2008).
22. See Competent Authority Assistance, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Individua
Is/International-Taxpayers/Competent-Authority-Assistance (last visited Oct. 24,
2013).
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role.
III. Problem: Inconsistent Standards of Arbitration Introduced
to Fix MAP Do Not Solve the Overall Problem of Double
Taxation
A. How Arbitration Attempts to "Fix" MVAP
Arbitration was introduced in an attempt to fix problems with
the lengthy process of MAP, competent authority disagreement, and
the lack of taxpayer involvement. Arbitration does not exist outside
of MAP - in most tax conventions, including those assessed below,
an issue must be brought to MAP before it can even enter
arbitration.23 In this way, arbitration "is a supplement to MAP and
used when the existing MAP fails to provide a resolution, rather than
a substitute for MAP." 24 Arbitration was initially included in MAP
because increasingly overwhelmed and underfunded governments
were not able to resolve even the simplest double taxation disputes in
a timely fashion. Multinational businesses were forced to wait two
years or more in some cases.2s As shown below, mandatory and
binding arbitration clauses are the most effective way to deal with the
limitations of MAP.
23. See Convention Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the French Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Income and Capital, U.S.-Fr.,
art. 26 (Mutual Agreement Procedure), August 31, 1994, amended by Protocol
January 13, 2009, 1963 U.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter the U.S. - France Tax Convention];
see also Convention Between the United States of America and Canada with respect
to Taxes on Income and on Capital, art. 21 (Mutual Agreement Procedure),
September 26, 1980, amended by Protocol September 21, 2007, TIAS 11087
[hereinafter the U.S.-Canada Tax Convention]; see also Convention Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom
of Belgium for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Belg., art. 24 (Mutual Agreement
Procedure), January 1, 1971, amended by Protocol November 27, 2006 [hereinafter
the U.S.-Belgium Tax Convention], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
trty/belgium.pdf; see also Convention Between the United States of America and
the Federal Republic of Germany for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital and to
Certain Other Taxes, U.S.-Ger., art. 25 (Mutual Agreement Procedure), January 1,
1991, amended by Protocol June 1, 2006 [hereinafter the U.S.-Germany Tax
Convention] available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/germany.pdf.
24. BERTOLINI & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 15.
25. DURST & CULBERTSON, supra note 12, at 2.
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1. Response to Length of MAP and Disagreement Between Competent
Authorities
States introduced arbitration to MAP in order to decrease the
"time taken for the competent authorities to settle the issues."26
Introducing mandatory and binding arbitration clause into MAP kills
two birds with one stone. Mandatory binding arbitration clauses
require that an issue under MAP that is submitted to arbitration be
decided in two years or less.27 The two year deadline provides an
incentive for competent authorities to agree if they wish to retain their
decision making power, while simultaneously limiting the time
interested parties must wait for a solution. Many argue the primary
benefit of arbitration is the implementation of an effective deadline,
not the actual arbitration proceeding itself.28
Countries want to maintain control over taxation standards
because tax revenue is an integral part of government operations.
By "setting a deadline for resolution of an issue by the competent
authorities, after which the competent authorities would lose
control over that issue, a compulsory arbitration rule can create an
incentive for resolution of the issue by the countries involved." 29
Voluntary arbitration does not have the same effect since
competent authorities do not have to submit to arbitration, and do
not fear losing control. This is why the "conclusion by many in
the business and the academic community is there needs to be a
more forceful and definitive solution to tax treaty disputes, such
as true mandatory [binding] arbitration."3 0
2. Response to Lack of Taxpayer Involvement
The current arbitration provisions in MAP still do not provide
sufficient taxpayer involvement. It is important for taxpayers to be
involved in resolution processes so they can be confident their interests
are represented. Additionally, taxpayers are more likely to accept an
arbitral decision if they are involved in the process. Some arbitration
provisions allow the taxpayer limited input "as taxpayers need to
26. BERTOLINI & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 15.
27. See U.S.-France Tax Convention, art. 26; U.S.-Canada Tax Convention, art.
21; U.S.-Belgium Tax Convention, art. 24; U.S.-Germany Tax Convention, art. 25,
supra note 23.
28. DURST & CULBERTSON, supra note 12, at 2.
29. Id.
30. BERTOLINI & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 15.
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ensure that they do all they can to help the competent authority that is
trying to help them."31 The OECD Model allows the taxpayer to
present evidence to the arbitration panel.32 The EU Arbitration
Convention also gives taxpayers "a far greater role in the arbitration
proceedings." 33 The U.S. -France Tax Convention has an "explicit role
for taxpayer submissions."34 Other arbitration provisions provide a
more informal role for taxpayer involvement, but the taxpayer "must
remember that the arbitration board must choose one of the positions
of the competent authorities." 35 This means the taxpayer "should not
push for the adoption of a position unlikely to be adopted by the
arbitration board" since it may result in "the arbiters choosing the
position of the other competent authority." 36
B. The Importance of "Mandatory" and "Binding" Arbitration
It is important to be precise when analyzing and writing about
international tax arbitration (ITA) in the context of MAP. The
adjectives modifying "arbitration" are game changers.
As discussed above, mandatory arbitration provisions in MAP
require disputes to submit to arbitration if not resolved by
competent authorities within two years. The mandatory aspect of
arbitration creates an effective deadline to competent authority
negotiations. It also encourages a final resolution since countries
want to retain control. In contrast, nonmandatory arbitration
clauses do not require competent authorities to submit an issue to
arbitration. It is significant that no MAP disputes under "'voluntary
arbitration' U.S. treaties have ever been subject to arbitration." 3 7
31. Harrington, supra note 7, at 757.
32. See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Model Tax
Convention on Income and on Capital, art. 25 2012, (updated 2010), [hereinafter
OECD Model Tax Convention], available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-
Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-
capital-2010_9789264175181-en#pagel2.
33. James P. Fuller & Barton W.S. Bassett, International Tax Controversies: The
United States Introduces Mandatory Arbitration for Resolving Certain Treaty Disputes, 34
INT'L TAX J. 15, 16 (2008).
34. Harrington, supra note 7, at 757.
35. Id. at 758.
36. Id.
37. Kris Schlaman & Brian Trauman, Mandatory arbitration designed to speed
agreement, Transfer Pricing International Journal, 1 (2011), available at
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/services/Tax/Global-Transfer-PricingServices
/Documents/ustrea ties-nov2011.pdf.
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Nonmandatory arbitration provisions do not promote resolution;
they provide no incentive motivating competent authorities to
agree.
Mandatory arbitration that is not binding is equally ineffective
to promoting an efficient resolution to tax disputes under MAP. In
the four U.S. tax conventions discussed below, the arbitration
decision is "binding on the Contracting States."38 This means that
the arbitral decision "constitute[s] a resolution by mutual
agreement ... and will be binding on both competent authorities
with respect to that case." 39 The problem, however, is that the
taxpayer who brought his issue to MAP in the first place can still
reject the resolution.40  Although most successful arbitration
provisions in MAP are mandatory and "binding," they can be
improved by becoming binding on the competent authorities and the
taxpayers, as elaborated below.41
C. International Tax Arbitration in Model Tax Conventions
Governments and organizations create model tax conventions
to standardize international tax practices and incorporate solutions
to ITA problems as they arise. Administratively, it is easier to
update one convention rather than each iteration of the convention
between countries. The following European model tax conventions
have been updated to include arbitration provisions in their MAP
clauses.
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's
Committee on Fiscal Affairs has created a Model Tax Convention on
Income and on Capital (the OECD Model Tax Convention). The most
recent version of the OECD Model Tax Convention was written in
2010, and includes commentaries on each article "intended to clarify
the purpose of such rules.42
In 2008, an arbitration provision was added to Article 25 (Mutual
38. See e.g., Protocol amending U.S.-Germany Tax Convention, supra note 23, at
35.
39. Memorandum of Understanding between the Competent Authorities of the
Kingdom of Belgium and the United States of America, U.S.-Belg. 5 (2009)
[hereinafter U.S.-Belgium Memorandum].
40. See Protocol amending U.S.-Germany Tax Convention, supra note 23, at 35.
41. See infra pp. 214-216.
42. See OECD Model Tax Convention, supra note 32, at C(25)-2.
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Agreement Procedure) of the OECD Model Tax Convention.43 The
provision permits "any unresolved issues" the competent authorities
could not agree on to be "submitted to arbitration if the person so
requests.""4 Many articles refer to the OECD arbitration provision as
"mandatory," but the language shows that arbitration is only
mandatory for the contracting states if the "person" so desires.45 The
"person" is the taxpayer who brought the dispute to the competent
authority for MAP resolution in the first place.46 As discussed above,
part of the benefit of mandatory binding arbitration is providing an
incentive for the competent authorities to reach an agreement. Since
the "person" submits to arbitration if the competent authorities
cannot agree, then arbitration can be thought of as involuntary, or
"mandatory," from the competent authorities' perspective. OECD
commentary explains that the arbitration "process is not dependent
on a prior authorization by the competent authorities: once the
requisite procedural requirements have been met, the unresolved
issues that prevent the conclusion of a mutual agreement must be
submitted to arbitration."47 The arbitral decision is then "binding
with respect to the specific issues submitted to arbitration."48 Thus,
ITA in MAP under the OECD Model Tax Convention can be
considered mandatory binding arbitration.
It is significant that the OECD Model Tax Convention provides
for mandatory binding arbitration because it sets the standard for
other systems. Most of Europe "follows the lead of the OECD
because so many of the members are also members of the European
Union."49  The U.N. Model Tax Convention, for example,
incorporates OECD's MAP clause but gives countries two options -
to include arbitration or not to include arbitration in the MAP
clause.50 To the rest of the world, the OECD's mandatory binding
43. See generally OECD Model Tax Convention, supra note 32.
44. See OECD Model Tax Convention, supra note 32, at M-59.
45. Id.
46. See id. ("Where a person considers that the actions of one or both of the
Contracting States result or will result for him in taxation not in accordance with
the provisions of this Convention, he may ... present his case to the competent
authority of the Contracting State of which he is a resident ... or national.").
47. OECD Model Tax Convention, supra note 32, at C(25)-23.
48. Id. at C(25)-30.
49. BERTOLINI & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 10.
50. See United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between
Developed and Developing Countries, art. 25, updated 2011 [hereinafter U.N.
194 [Vol. 37:1
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arbitration provision "inspires confidence in identifying 'international
tax dispute resolution' as a discipline," and is its first "mainstream
and global endorsement."5'
The EU Model Tax Convention also provides for mandatory
binding arbitration, but not for double taxation, because double
taxation issues were largely dispensed of with the economic
integration under the European Union. Since the European Union
"has effectively eliminated double taxation within the EU for many
taxpayers, specifically those doing business within the EU,"52 double
taxation issues are unlikely to arise between two member countries.
Thus, the European Union "has bifurcated the issue with a mandatory
arbitration provision in dealing with transfer pricing issues but
outside of the normal tax treaty regime."53 It is noteworthy, but
outside the scope of this paper, that the EU Tax Convention still
provides for mandatory arbitration within its specific transfer pricing
and establishment issues.
The U.S. Model Tax Convention borrows from the OECD in some
ways, but does not include a mandatory binding arbitration provision
in MAP. In fact, the U.S. model does not contain any type of
arbitration provision, so the "sole method for relief from double
taxation is through the voluntary MAP proceedings."54 Fortunately
"the U.S. position is shifting to one of arbitration"5 because the
international economy is growing rapidly, leading to an increase in
international tax disputes that need a more effective resolution
process.5 6 Moving forward, the U.S. model is likely to look to the
OECD for guidance, since it already incorporates some of its laws and
model provisions. As discussed below, there are four current U.S. tax
conventions that contain mandatory arbitration provisions.
Model Tax Convention] available at
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/UNModel_2011_U pdate.pdf.
51. Chloe Burnett, International Tax Arbitration, 36 Aus. TAx REv. 173, 173 (2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120122.
52. BERTOLINI & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 10.
53. Id. at 2.
54. Id. at 10.
55. Id. at 8.
56. DuRST & CULBERTSON, supra note 12, at 1.
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IV. Mandatory Binding Arbitration Provisions Exist in Four
Current U.S. Tax Conventions' MAP Articles
At this point, I will introduce the four U.S. tax conventions (with
Belgium, Germany, Canada, and France) that contain mandatory
binding arbitration provisions within their MAP clauses.57 It is
important to examine the working tax agreements between countries
because ITA decisions that resolve MAP are protected by non-
disclosure and confidentiality agreements and provisions. In the
United States, public data about mandatory arbitration in MAP is
limited because few cases reach resolution and no outcomes are
published.58 Consequently, the actual negotiated agreements are the
only nonacademic examples of mandatory binding arbitration in U.S.
ITA. As discussed below, comparing these arbitration provisions to
ICA issues is more helpful than speculating how ITA can improve
MAP.
All four mandatory binding arbitration provisions are updates
to existing tax conventions. The provisions were introduced
through Protocols and explained through "Technical Explanations."
Protocols are official documents included in the body of a treaty.
Technical Explanations are separately published guidelines that
explain the background and intent of Protocol provisions. Technical
Explanations "do not have the force of law and only serve as an aid
for interpretation."59 Procedurally, the arbitration provisions rely on
additional agreements like Memorandums of Understanding,
Arbitration Board Operating Guidelines, and Diplomatic Notes,
which are discussed below.60
A. U.S.-Belgium Tax Convention
The Convention between the United States and the Kingdom of
Belgium for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention
of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income (the U.S.-
57. See Schlaman & Trauman, supra note 37, at 1 ("currently, mandatory
arbitration provisions are included in only four US income tax treaties: Belgium,
Canada, France, and Germany"); see also Craig A. Sharon, Treaty Arbitration: Where
Art Thou?, 41 TAx MGM'T INT'L J. 91, 92 (2012) ("the United States has incorporated
mandatory arbitration into four new treaties (i.e., Germany, Belgium, France, and
Canada)").
58. Sharon, supra note 57, at 92.
59. BERTOLINI & WEAVER, supra note 6, at 18.
60. See infra pp. 196-197.
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Belgium Tax Convention) was the first U.S. tax convention to
include a mandatory binding arbitration clause. In 2006, the
Protocol Amending the U.S.-Belgium Tax Convention entered into
force, and updated Article 24 (Mutual Agreement Procedure) to
include the mandatory binding arbitration clause.61 In 2009, a
Memorandum of Understanding and Arbitration Board Operating
Guidelines were issued to provide procedural guidelines for
arbitration under MAP.62
B. U.S.-Germany Tax Convention
The Convention between the United States of America and the
Federal Republic of Germany for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income
and Capital and to Certain Other Taxes (the U.S.-Germany Tax
Convention) also contains a mandatory binding arbitration
provision.63 This provision was included in Article 25 (Mutual
Agreement Procedure) in a 2006 Protocol amending the convention.
Procedural rules for the arbitration process are included in paragraph
22 of Article XVI of the Protocol, and explained in a 2007 Technical
Explanation.64
C. U.S.-Canada Tax Convention
The Convention between the United States of America and
Canada with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital (the U.S.-
Canada Tax Convention) contains a mandatory binding arbitration
clause from a 2007 amending Protocol.65 The procedure is set out in a
diplomatic Arbitration Note, and explained in a Technical
Explanation.66 The two countries have even released information
about MAP decisions that went to arbitration and were resolved. By
2012, the United States had "won" three decisions under mandatory
61. See U.S.-Belgium Tax Convention, supra note 23.
62. See U.S.-Belgium Memorandum, supra note 39.
63. See U.S.-Germany Tax Convention, supra note 23.
64. See id.; see also Department of the Treasury Technical Explanation of the
Protocol Signed at Berlin on June 1, 2006 [hereinafter the U.S.-Germany Technical
Explanation].
65. See U.S.-Canada Tax Convention, supra note 23.
66. See Diplomatic Notes: Annex A to the Convention, signed September 21,
2007 [hereinafter the U.S.-Canada Diplomatic Note]; see also Department of the
Treasury Technical Explanation of the Protocol Done at Chelsea on September 21,
2007 [hereinafter the U.S.-Canada Technical Explanation].
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binding arbitration against Canada.67 As a result of these decisions, the
IRS has "collected a significant sum of money, possibly in excess of
$100 million."68
D. U.S. - France Tax Convention
The Convention between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the French Republic for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital (the U.S. - France Tax
Convention) is the last convention to be updated with a mandatory
binding arbitration provision.69 The provision was added to Article
26 (Mutual Agreement Procedure) by a 2009 Protocol.70 Similar to
the other treaties, the procedural rules are provided in the 2009
Memorandum of Understanding, and explained in the 2009
Technical Explanation.71
V. Systems Development: We Should View Tax Arbitration
as a Development of International Commercial
Arbitration Rather than as a MAP Fix
A. Brief Overview of International Commercial Arbitration
International commercial arbitration "has become the generally
acceptable method of resolving disputes between transnational
contracting parties." 72 Its success in the private sphere is likely
because businesses "wish to avoid the perceived uncertainty and
67. Patrick Temple-West, International arbitration for tax disputes, "baseball" style,
Reuters, Nov. 25, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/25/
us-usa-tax-arbitration-idUSBRE8AOO6T20121125.
68. Id.
69. See U.S.-France Tax Convention, supra note 23.
70. Id.
71. See Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the January 13, 2009 signing
of the protocol to the U.S.-France Income Tax Convention [hereinafter the U.S. -
France Memorandum], available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-Protocol-Memorandum-of-Understanding-
France-1-13-2009.pdf; see also The Technical Explanation to the 2009 Protocol
[hereinafter . the U.S.-France Technical Explanation], available at
http://www.treasury.gov/ resources-center/ tax-
policy/treaties/Documents/tefranceprot09/pdf.
72. TIBOR VARADY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, A
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECrIVE 27 (West's American Casebook Series, 4th ed. 2009).
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unpredictability of foreign courts."73 Like the current increase in tax
disputes submitted to MAP, the escalation of commercial disputes
submitted to arbitration led to the development of a detailed ICA
system.74
ICA provisions exist in many international agreements,
conventions, and treaties.75 Rules for arbitration proceedings come
from many sources as well. For example, the United Nationals
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has
promulgated rules and model laws for ICA.76 In the United States, the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) codifies arbitration rules and
procedures.'7 Numerous international, regional, and national arbitral
institutions have been created to administer these and other ICA
rules.78
A major part of ICA's success comes from the widespread
acceptance of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the N.Y. Convention). The N.Y.
Convention ensures that signatories' courts recognize agreements to
arbitrate, and also recognize and enforce arbitral awards. 79 A
"major purpose of the New York Convention was to ensure the
efficacy of awards by limiting the grounds upon which a national
court could refuse to recognize or enforce an award."80 Limiting
domestic courts' ability to set aside awards encourages parties to
submit to arbitration because a potential award can be binding.
ICA is now a widely accepted dispute resolution system, with
issues being resolved constantly by the international community.
There has been an "unparalleled proliferation of legislative acts
devoted to international commercial arbitration, and at the same
73. Id. at 27-28.
74. See Gloria Miccioli, International Commercial Arbitration, The American
Society of International Law (2011), available at http://www.asil.org/sites/default
/files/ERG_.ARB.pdf ("as the number of international commercial disputes
mushrooms, so too does the use of arbitration to resolve them").
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq.
78. See a recent list of arbitration institution options at http://www.arbitration
online.org/research/ArbitrationInstitStat/index.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
79. See The United Nations Conference on International Commercial
Arbitration, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 7, 1958 [hereinafter the N.Y. Convention], available at http://www.
uncitral.org/pdf/english/ texts/arbitration/NY-conv/XXII_1_e.pdf.
80. VARADY ET AL., supra note 72, at 840.
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time arbitration rules and party stipulations have thickened with
detail, and have become more discerning."81 It is precisely these
well-developed "details" ITA should look to for guidance. Moving
forward, I will examine the important issues in ICA, and how they
have been addressed in the four U.S. tax conventions that include
mandatory binding arbitration (which will sometimes be referred to
as "example tax conventions"). Instead of looking at mandatory
binding arbitration as a response or solution to MAP, we should
look at how we can improve it based on the ICA model.
B. Important ICA Issues and How They Apply to ITA
1. Goals of ICA
One of the primary goals of ICA is to encourage international
economic growth and development by providing businesses a forum
for dispute resolution they can trust and control. ICA "has been
justified and marketed with emphasis on its ability to be structured,
and restructured, to meet the needs of businessmen." 82 Its appeal is
the resolution of "business disputes between or among transnational
parties through the use of one or more arbitrators rather than through
the courts."83 Unlike the "courts which are tied to procedure and
substantive law which have not been tailored to the needs of the
international business community ... arbitration may be shaped to
met the wishes of the parties, and it also gives more room for
maneuver in the search for a mutually acceptable compromise."84
Therefore, businesses are more likely to expand or invest abroad since
they can include an arbitration agreement their contracts, and be
confident it will be enforced.
Similarly, the ITA is meant to encourage taxpayers to
participate in the worldwide economy. Arbitration within MAP is
meant to eliminate or reduce double taxation in accordance with the
agreed-upon tax conventions.85 This requires the ITA to provide
governments a fair way to resolve disputes when two countries
81. Id. at 479.
82. Id. at 45.
83. Miccioli, supra note 74.
84. VARADY ET AL., supra note 72, at 45.
85. See U.S.-France Tax Convention, art. 26; U.S.-Canada Tax Convention, art.
21; U.S.-Belgium Tax Convention, art. 24; U.S.-Germany Tax Convention, art. 25,
supra note 23.
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would benefit by taxing the same person. Another important goal
of ITA is to provide the taxpayer with definitive and certain
knowledge of his tax liability. This is particularly important because
arbitration can only be invoked by the taxpayer after initiating
MAP, so the development of ITA depends upon taxpayer trust and
use. By addressing both government and taxpayer needs, "tax
treaty arbitration provides one hope for fiscal symmetry, thereby
reducing the fiscal barriers to cross-border trade and investment."8 6
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) believes the
benefits of commercial arbitration transfer well to mandatory binding
arbitration in double taxation disputes.87 The ICC has even been cited
by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the benefits of "expanding the
range of issues resolvable in international arbitration."88 The ICC
explicitly "recommend[s] that compulsory and binding arbitration in
international tax matters should be adopted in bilateral or multilateral
tax conventions . . . based upon the broad experience of ICC in
commercial arbitration."8 9  The ICC believes that including
mandatory binding arbitration in tax conventions is effective because
it "always reaches a conclusion, provides for impartial
determinations with proper taxpayer participation, and applies law
rather than expediency." 90 This recommendation is based on the
ICC's recognition of ICA success in the private sector. It is clear to the
ICC that the goals of ITA reflect the goals of ICA, showing the
usefulness of developing tax arbitration based on ICA models.
2. Arbitrability and the Scope of an Arbitration Agreement
Arbitrability is a gateway issue that reflects whether a certain
dispute can be resolved by arbitration or whether it must be
adjudicated by a court. Broadly, the arbitrability of an issue
"depends on the existence, validity, and scope of an arbitration
86. WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES, CHAPER 10 "ARBITRABILITY AND TAX" 182 (L. Mistelis & S. Brekoulakis
eds. 2009).
87. See ICC, supra note 20, at 1 ("based upon the broad experience of ICC in
commercial arbitration, we believe that this form of dispute resolution is both
attractive and effective").
88. VARADY ET AL., supra note 72, at 33; see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634 m. 18, 637, n. 19 (1985).
89. ICC, supra note 20, 1.
90. Id. at 2.
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agreement. 91 A more narrow interpretation is "whether mandatory
law in a given jurisdiction disallows arbitration of disputes dealing
with a particular subject matter because that subject matter is
infused with high-order public policy concerns."92
The nonarbitrability of issues in ICA is usually based on these
public policy concerns. Since arbitration operates in the private
sphere, "countries have traditionally been reluctant to allow
arbitration in spheres where there is a strong public interest at
stake."93 In ICA, issues that are usually nonarbitrable because of
public policy include disputes about antitrust, securities law,
intellectual property, and political embargoes, among others.94
Taxation is a different type of public interest concern, but it still has
public policy implications because it dictates the scope of services a
government can provide. These public policy concerns limit the
issues the arbitral board can decide; however, party imposed
restrictions are more of an issue of scope.
The arbitrability of a double taxation dispute was established
with the introduction of mandatory binding arbitration into MAP
clauses, although the scope of the resulting arbitration is limited. The
U.S. tax conventions with Germany, Canada, and France limit the
issues an arbitral board can decide "to a determination regarding the
amount of income, expense, or tax reportable to the Contracting
States." 95 Thus, not all double taxation issues are arbitrable because
the scope of the arbitration provision is itself limited. Some tax
arbitrations will fail because the "arbitration clause ... remove[s]
certain types of tax controversies from the arbitrators' adjudicatory
power," 96 making the issue un-arbitrable. The ITA might benefit
from allowing more tax issues to be arbitrated; however, like ICA's
success despite limitations, "international tax arbitration even in a
91. VARADY ET AL., supra note 72, at 98.
92. Id. at 99.
93. Id. at 232.
94. Id. at 233.
95. U.S.-Germany Tax Convention, supra note 23, at Art. XVI, paragraph 22 (b);
see also U.S.-Canada Technical Explanation, supra note 66, at p. 45 ("shall provide a
determination regarding only the amount of income, expense or tax reportable to
the Contracting States"); see also U.S.-France Memorandum, supra note 71 ("the
determination reached by an arbitration panel in the Proceeding shall be limited to
a determination regarding the amount of income, expense or tax reportable to the
Contracting States").
96. PARK, supra note 86, at 180.
202 [Vol. 37:1
Three's (Not) a Crowd in International Tax Arbitration
limited form is a good thing."97
Additionally, nonarbitrability has been held to apply to rights
that parties cannot freely dispose of. In Fincantieri-Cantieri v.
Ministry of Defense, the Italian Court of Appeal held that these "diritti
indisponibili" are rights within the state's control (like the U.N.
Security Council's embargo against Iraq) that parties cannot
circumvent by arbitration. 98 On the other hand, rights within the
party's control, such as economic rights, can be freely disposed of
and are capable of arbitration.99
A decision concerning the arbitrability of an issue is subject to
change throughout the life of a dispute. For example, in Fincantieri
the Italian court decided that the issue was nonarbitrable at the
beginning of the dispute, but a Swiss court later held in Coveme SpA
v. Compagnie Francaise des Isolants SA that the arbitrability of the
same issue should be decided at the enforcement stage.100
Arbitrability issues can arise at four points in the life of an arbitral
dispute. First, it can arise "before a national court deliberating
whether to enforce an arbitration agreement."10o Second, an issue
could come up before the "arbitrators themselves as they try to
decide the scope" of their own ability to arbitrate.102 Third, the issue
can arise before a court in the "country where the arbitration has
taken place, in an action to set aside an award."O3 Finally, the issue
of arbitrability can come before a court in the country that is being
"asked to recognize and enforce an award."104 The last two issues of
arbitrability are particularly important since they can potentially
allow a court to refuse to enforce an award, as discussed below.
As it stands, the arbitrability of ITA disputes is decided at the
first stage of mandatory binding arbitration. The competent
authorities must submit to arbitration if they cannot reach an
agreement within two years. 05 The arbitration clause is part of
97. Burnett, supra note 51, at 182.
98. See VARADY ET AL., supra note 72, at 237, reproducing Fincantieri-Cantieri
(Italy) v. Ministry of Defense (Iraq), 1994.
99. Id.
100. VARADY ET AL., supra note 72, at 243 (citing Coveme).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See U.S.-France Tax Convention, art. 26; U.S.-Canada Tax Convention, art.
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MAP, which the countries are already engaged in if it reaches
arbitration, so there won't be a dispute about whether the provision
is valid. Instead, arbitrability will be decided unilaterally by the
competent authorities themselves, since they can "agree that the
particular case is not suitable for determination by arbitration."10 6 If
ITA evolves to look more like ICA, however, the competent
authorities will not necessarily be able to opt out of arbitration, and
arbitrability may be debated at the enforcement level as well.
3. Existence and Validity of an Arbitration Agreement
In ICA, arbitration is initiated because of a preexisting
arbitration clause or, less often, because the parties mutually agreed
to arbitration.107 Often one party will not want to submit to
arbitration and will dispute the validity of the arbitration clause.
This gateway issue in ICA corresponds to the debated mandatory
aspect of submitting MAP issues to arbitration. In order for
arbitration to be utilized and effective, parties must be confident
their choice to submit a current or future dispute to arbitration will
be recognized.
Although parties can challenge the arbitration clause in ICA,
courts must "refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the
said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed."108 Many arbitration clauses are upheld under this
sufficiently high standard. This suggests that the "mandatory" aspect
of tax arbitration is a key component to its success. The ICC supports
this view, and draws on its ICA experience to suggest that the
limitations of arbitration under existing MAP clauses should be
changed. For example, the ICC suggests "either state may initiate
arbitration"and"the affected taxpayers should have the right of
initiative in all cases, whether or not the competent authorities have
agreed."109 Furthermore, "arbitration should be compulsory, whether
initiated at the instance of a contracting state or a taxpayer."110
21; U.S.-Belgium Tax Convention, art. 24; U.S.-Germany Tax Convention, art. 25,
supra note 23.
106. See e.g., U.S.-German Tax Convention, supra note 23, at art. XVI, paragraph
22.
107. See VARADY ET AL., supra note 72, at 97.
108. N.Y. Convention, supra note 79, at art. 11 (3).
109. ICC, supra note 20, at 4.
110. Id.
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Unfortunately, all four United States examples with arbitration
clauses include exceptions to the mandatory initiation of arbitration
proceedings."n The U.S.-Belgium and the U.S.-France Tax
Convention mandate binding arbitration for "any case where the
competent authorities have endeavored but are unable to reach an
agreement."112 Once the issue is submitted to arbitration, "neither
competent authority [may] cease unilaterally to consider a case;"
however, before arbitration, "the competent authorities [may] agree
that the particular case is not suitable for determination by
arbitration." 13  The U.S.-Germany and U.S.-Canada Tax
Conventions provide for mandatory binding arbitration for issues
involving the "enumerated articles of the Convention" and issues
the "competent authorities agree is suitable for determination by
arbitration." Like the first two, however, these conventions include
the exception allowing "competent authorities [to] agree before the
date on which arbitration proceedings would otherwise have begun,
[that the issue] is not suitable for determination by arbitration."114
The ability of the competent authority to decide that a tax issue is
not arbitrable is similar to the unilateral power of ICA arbitrators' to
decide their own ability to arbitrate. This Kompetenz-Kompetenz
principle in ICA makes it "clear that arbitrators have competence to
decide upon their own competence."115  Similarly, competent
authorities in ITA have the power to decide whether mandatory
arbitration is really mandatory. Unlike in ICA, where the "final word
on the issue of arbitral competence belongs to the courts,"1 6 there is
no appeal process when competent authorities decide that an issue is
not suitable for arbitration.117 In order to hold competent authorities
accountable, ITA should give courts the final decision to arbitrate, as
courts have the power to decide the existence and validity of an
arbitration agreement in ICA.
111. Schlaman & Trauman, supra note 37, at 2.
112. U.S.-Belgium Memorandum, supra note 39, at 1; see also U.S.-France
Memorandum, supra note 71 (same language).
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. U.S.-German Technical Explanation, supra note 64, at 38; see also, U.S.-
Canada Tax Convention, supra note 23, at art. 21 paragraph 6(b).
115. VARADY ET AL., supra note 72, at 99.
116. Id.
117. See infra pp. 211-213.
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4. Choice of Law
In ICA, parties should include a choice of law clause specifying
what law arbitrators should apply to the dispute. There is a
distinction, however, between substantive law governing the overall
contract, substantive law governing the arbitration agreement, and
procedural law governing the arbitration process. The choice of
forum, or seat of arbitration, is equally important because lex arbitri
provides default procedural internal rules according to the seat of
arbitration.18 Most issues arise in ICA when parties do not fully
understand how their choices of law and seat of arbitration work
together or against each other.
ITA does not have a lex arbitri problem because the procedure is
agreed upon by the two contracting countries, which are the only
countries that will ever be involved in a tax dispute under their
convention. Where pre-planned procedure falls short, the
competent authorities "may modify or supplement the . .. rules and
procedures as necessary to more effectively implement the intent of
paragraph 5 of Article 25 [mandatory binding arbitration in MAP] to
eliminate double taxation." 119 Even without these issues, however,
the substantive law chosen by countries and applied by arbitrators
on the merits of the case is not always clear since ITA arbitrators are
not allowed to report how they reached their decision.120
In MAP, competent authorities never disclose how or why they
reached an agreement.121 Since mandatory binding arbitration is an
extension of MAP, the arbitrators are also protected by this rule.
Only two U.S. conventions with mandatory binding arbitration
provisions specify applicable substantive law.122 Both the U.S. -
Germany and U.S. - Canada Tax Conventions include a hierarchy of
law the arbitrators shall apply. In descending order of priority, the
applicable law is: (1) the Tax Convention itself; (2) any agreement
118. See VARADY ET AL., supra note 72, at 480 ("In addition to institutional rules,
procedural norms of the municipal law governing arbitration (the lex arbitri) are
relevant.").
119. See e.g. U.S.-German Tax Convention, supra note 23, at art. XVI paragraph
22(q).
120. See U.S.-France Tax Convention, art. 26; U.S.-Canada Tax Convention, art.
21; U.S.-Belgium Tax Convention, art. 24; U.S.-Germany Tax Convention, art. 25,
supra note 23.
121. Id.
122. See U.S.-Germany Tax Convention and U.S.-Canada Tax Convention, supra
note 23.
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between the two Contracting States about the Convention, like a
Memorandum of Understanding, a Diplomatic Note, or a Technical
Explanation; (3) the laws of the two Contracting States that are not
inconsistent; and (4) the OECD commentary on its model tax
convention.123 Neither the U.S. - Belgium nor the U.S. - France Tax
Convention tell the arbitrators what law to apply.
Inclusion of the choice of substantive law may be superfluous
since MAP arbitration decisions are never published, but inclusion
would help ITA transparency and improve taxpayer use and trust of
the system. The secrecy of MAP proceedings is justified by its non-
precedential status.124 When compared to ICA, however, with its
history of established and adjudicated choice of law rules, it is
evident that a different harm than possible precedent might occur.
The lack of transparency may result in taxpayers being unwilling to
submit their issue to MAP arbitration. Taxpayers need to trust that
the decision about their tax liability was based on applicable and
equitable law. To this end, the ICC suggests that the tax "arbitration
decision should be based on law, including the domestic laws of the
state parties to the arbitration, treaties, and international law.125
Even if all MAP arbitration clauses begin to include references to
substantive law, there will be even more transparency and use of
ITA if taxpayers are involved in the proceedings.
5. Formation of the Arbitration Board
Parties to ICA can agree on procedural rules that fit their needs.
They can decide to "arbitrate under the rules of an Arbitral
Institution or to use an ad hoc procedure."126 While ad hoc
arbitration tends to be "less expensive and more flexible,"
institutional arbitration "provides an independent, neutral set of
rules that already exist." 127 Regardless, procedural rules must
satisfy due process. Both parties must be subject to "equal
treatment during the arbitral proceedings," and "given equal
123. U.S.-Germany Tax Convention, supra note 23, at art. XVI paragraph 22(i); see
also U.S.-Canada Technical Explanation, supra note 66, at p. 45.
124. See U.S.-France Tax Convention art. 26; U.S.-Canada Tax Convention, art.
21; U.S.-Belgium Tax Convention, art. 24; U.S.-Germany Tax Convention, art. 25,
supra note 23.
125. ICC, supra note 20, at 4.
126. VARADY ET AL., supra note 72, at 28.
127. Miccioli, supra note 74.
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opportunity to appear at hearings." 128 Arbitration institutions are
often incorporated into ICA agreements because they have
developed procedures to satisfy these needs.
ITA procedure in the four example tax conventions is based on
agreements between the two contracting states. Procedure follows
MAP until arbitration is initiated. At that point, the conduct of the
arbitration proceedings depends on the agreement of the two
contracting states, as outlined in the Memorandum of
Understanding (U.S.-Belgium, and U.S.-France), the Protocol (U.S.-
Germany), or the Diplomatic Note (U.S.-Canada).129
First, the arbitration board must be formed. All four example
conventions provide for ad hoc formation of the board, with a few
restrictions.130 Generally, competent authorities will choose one
person from each of their countries to serve on the arbitration board,
and then those two board members will appoint a chairperson who
is from a third, different country.131 The U.S. conventions with
Belgium, Germany, and Canada reference the OECD, which
provides arbitrators if the competent authorities fail to appoint a
member or if the members cannot agree on a chair.132 The "ad hoc
arbitration tribunals [will probably be] composed of private sector
professionals (tax lawyers, accountants, perhaps economists, who
will be chose by internal and likely undisclosed processes)."133
A major concern in ICA is the neutrality and impartiality of the
arbitrators, which are "prerequisites to independence." 34
Independent arbitrators are "one of the crucial comparative
advantages of international commercial arbitration" because they
preserve due process by being "a forum which is essentially
equidistant from both parties."135 Ad hoc tribunal formation in ITA
is capable of appointing independent arbitrators, but it would be
easier if an arbitration institution were involved because
128. VARADY ET AL., supra note 72, at 498-99.
129. See section 4 above.
130. See U.S.-France Tax Convention, art. 26; U.S.-Canada Tax Convention, art.
21; U.S.-Belgium Tax Convention, art. 24; U.S.-Germany Tax Convention, art. 25,
supra note 23.
131. See e.g. U.S.-Belgium Memorandum, supra note 39, at 2.
132. Id.
133. Christians, supra note 3, at 181.
134. VARADY ET AL., supra note 72, at 290.
135. Id. at 282.
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institutions' knowledge and experience would likely make
formation of the board quicker, and would help the parties avoid
confusion.136 Also, an institution's carefully curated list of potential
arbitrators can settle these disputes; "since many commercial
transactions have tax implications, experienced international
commercial arbitrators or recognized scholars in the arbitration field
could be asked to expand their knowledge of tax issues and serve on
the arbitration panel." 37
In fact, the competent authority for the United States (the IRS),
has "entered into an agreement with the International Centre for
Dispute Resolution (ICDR) to provide administrative services in
support of arbitration under the Mutual Agreement Procedure." 38
The ICDR "carries out the international operations of the American
Arbitration Association (AAA)," and is active in ICA.139 This
overlap of institutional support shows how the United States
realizes that ITA should incorporate ICA methods. In providing
services like selecting arbitrators, the ICDR "draws on its
institutional experience, international expertise, multilingual case
management staff, flexibility and a commitment to service along
with cultural sensitivity." 40 The attributes were developed through
the ICDR's ICA experience, and will be passed on to help improve
and develop ITA procedure.
6. Conduct of Arbitration Proceedings
Fees are an important consideration in ICA. These include the
arbitrator's fees, facilities and logistical fees, and arbitration board
expenses. Control over procedure comes at a price, and the
"primary deterrent to the development of international commercial
arbitration is the cost of the proceedings."141 The cost comes from
institutional fees, the price of the arbitrator's time, getting to and
carrying out the arbitration meetings, and other expenses. In ITA,
the fees are shared equally between the contracting states, and the
136. Sed Crest, A New Way to Resolve International Tax Disputes, 16 INT'L TAX REV.
24, 25 (2005).
137. Covington, supra note 8, at 386.
138. IRS, Mandatory Tax Treaty Arbitration: Identification of Arbitrators,
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/International-Businesses/Mandatory-Tax-Treaty-
Arbitration (last visited Dec. 17, 2012).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Covington, supra note 8, at 384.
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U.S. conventions with Belgium, Germany, and France cap the
arbitrator's fees at $2,000 U.S. dollars per day.142 The U.S.-Belgium
convention limits the days a board member can be compensated to
"no more than three days of preparation, for two meeting days ...
and for travel days," 43 providing an incentive to reach a timely
conclusion. In all four conventions, the arbitration board's expenses
are "set in accordance with the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Schedule of Fees."144 Notably, the
taxpayer is exempt from all expenses in this process,145 which
should encourage him to bring issues to MAP. Overall, "no
additional cost should be incurred in arbitrating a tax case... since it
should be no more complicated than arbitrating complex
commercial matters."'4
A major difference between ICA and ITA procedure is the
concerned party's ability to contribute to the arbitration. In ICA,
one of the parties initiates arbitration, and then both parties present
their case to the board. In ITA, however, a taxpayer brings an issue
to his competent authority, and the authority then engages in MAP
with the other country's competent authority.147 If two years pass
and the issue was submitted to arbitration under a mandatory
binding arbitration clause, only the competent authorities are
allowed input.48 Under the U.S.-France Tax Convention a taxpayer
may consult with his advisors and provide input that may influence
the arbitrators' ultimate decision."149 The problem, as discussed
below, is the arbitration board is limited to choosing one of the
competent authority's proposed resolutions. What use is the
taxpayer's input if it is different than that of his competent authority?
Should the taxpayer be able to submit his own proposed resolutions?
142. See U.S.-France Memorandum, supra note 71; U.S.-Canada Diplomatic Note,
supra note 66; U.S.-Belgium Memorandum, supra note 39; U.S.-Germany Tax
Convention, supra note 23.
143. U.S.-Belgium Memorandum, supra note 39, at 5.
144. See U.S.-France Memorandum, supra note 71; U.S.-Canada Diplomatic Note,
supra note 66; U.S.-Belgium Memorandum, supra note 39; U.S.-Germany Tax
Convention, supra note 23.
145. Id.
146. Covington, supra note 8, at 384.
147. See U.S.-France Memorandum, supra note 71; U.S.-Canada Diplomatic Note,
supra note 66; U.S.-Belgium Memorandum, supra note 39; U.S.-Germany Tax
Convention, supra note 23.
148. Id.
149. Schlaman & Trauman, supra note 37, at 2.
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If ITA develops more along the lines of ICA, as this paper suggests,
taxpayer input will become more important. Once again, the ICC
suggests that ITA be modified to reflect the ICA position that
taxpayers "should be provided an opportunity to present their views,
including the right to submit all relevant information and
documentation, to present oral and written arguments . .. and to
respond to arguments or evidence submitted by the states
involved."150
Discovery in ICA is a contested issue because of the tension
between avoiding complicated procedures and establishing critical
facts.151 Sometimes parties submit to arbitration to avoid the broad,
time consuming "American-style discovery."152 On the other hand,
discovery could be necessary for fact-finding, and arbitrators "lack
coercive power" the courts have. 53 In ICA there are conflicting court
decisions about whether district courts have the power to compel
discovery in arbitration tribunals under 28 U.S.C. § 1782.154 In ITA,
however, the arbitrators choose between two submitted proposed
resolutions and consider "additional information ... only at its
request."1SS The tax conventions with Belgium, Germany, Canada,
and France do not include procedures for discovery because all the
information either side thinks is necessary will be included in their
proposed resolutions.156 Discovery seems to be one issue that does
not parallel ICA, but this might change if the method of decision
making changes. In that event, the ICC proposes that the
"production of evidence should be subject to the limitations on
production available under the governing domestic law,"57 which
goes back to the choice of law and seat of arbitration issues.
150. ICC, supra note 20, at 4.
151. VARADY ET AL., supra note 72, at 522.
152. See Id. ("parties often choose arbitration over court litigation in order to
avoid complicated procedures, such as those involved in broad discovery").
153. Id.
154. See Id. at 523; 28 U.S.C. § 1782 ("The district court of the district in which a
person resides or is found may order him to give testimony or statement or to
produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or
international tribunal...").
155. See U.S.-France Memorandum, supra note 71; U.S.-Canada Diplomatic Note,
supra note 66; U.S.-Belgium Memorandum, supra note 39; U.S.-Germany Tax
Convention, supra note 23.
156. Id.
157. ICC, supra note 20, at 4.
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Termination of the arbitration proceeding is easier in ITA. Many
ICA institutions, including UNCITRAL and AAA allow termination
if the parties settle before the arbitration award is made.58 The
tribunal may also be terminated by claimant withdrawal, "unless the
respondent objects thereto and the arbitral tribunal recognizes a
legitimate interest on his part in obtaining a final settlement of the
dispute."159 This goes back to the "mandatory" nature of arbitration
in ICA if the parties' original contract included an arbitration clause.
In ITA, there are more allowances for termination. Under the U.S. -
Belgium Tax Convention, the arbitration may be terminated by the
arbitral board itself, by the competent authorities reaching an
agreement independently of the arbitration, or by the taxpayer who
brought the case in the first place.160 The other three U.S. conventions
limit termination to competent authorities reaching an agreement,
and taxpayer termination (with the exception of the U.S. - Canada
Tax Convention).161 In order to mirror ICA, ITA proceedings should
only be terminated upon competent authority agreement (like
settlement in ICA), and upon request of the taxpayer. The ICC goes a
step further, and recommends that only the taxpayer should have the
"right to discontinue [because] the arbitration was begun at their
behest."162
7. Decision-Making and Appeal
Another major difference exists between ICA and ITA when it
comes to arbitral decisions. In ICA, the arbitration board hears from
both sides, applies an objective standard within the applicable law,
and reaches a decision on the merits that can incorporate either
sides' position, or choose a different course of action. In ITA,
however, the arbitral board is "not free to create its own
conclusion."163  The board must choose one of the proposed
158. See VARADY ET AL., supra note 72, at 615-16.
159. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Art. 32,
June 21, 1985 (Termination of proceedings) paragraph 2(a).
160. See U.S.-Belgium Memorandum, supra note 39.
161. See U.S.-Germany Tax Convention, supra note 23; U.S.-Canada Diplomatic
Note, supra note 66; U.S.-France Memorandum, supra note 71.
162. ICC, supra note 20, at 4.
163. PwC, Dispute Resolution - The rise of treaty arbitration clauses, Tax Controversy
and Dispute Resolution Alert: Preventing - Managing - Resolving Tax Audits and
Disputes Worldwide 2 (Aug. 25, 2011), available at http://www.
pwc.com/en-GX/ gx/ tax/newsletters/ tax-controversy-disputeresolutions/ assets/
pwc-treaty-arbitration-clauses.pdf [hereinafter Dispute Resolution].
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resolution papers each competent authority submits.164 This type of
decision making is called "baseball arbitration"165 because it is
"similar to the process used in the United States by major league
baseball and uses an approach whereby an arbitration board (made
up of three arbitrators) may choose only the proposal of one side to
the dispute."166 Also, the arbitration board must decide the case
within the time allowed by the tax convention. The U.S.-Belgium
Tax Convention requires the board to decide "within 9 months of
the appointment of the chair." 67 The U.S. conventions with
Germany, Canada, and France limit the time to reach a decision to
only 6 months.168
The baseball approach and time limits to arbitral decisions stem
from the perspective that the ITA will improve MAP by providing
yet another mechanism for forcing the competent authorities to
come to a decision. Since one of the competent authority's proposed
resolutions will be chosen, there is "pressure on each competent
authority to offer a reasonable resolution and therefore increases the
likelihood that a compromise between the competent authorities
will occur before an arbitral decision."169 In this way, baseball
arbitration is clearly meant to "fix" MAP by encouraging the
competent authorities to reach an agreement, at which case the
arbitration is terminated. This emphasis on reaching a settlement is
mostly likely the reason the ITA procedures do not mention
discovery, and why compensation is limited to only a few days.
ITA should be developed such that issues will be fully
arbitrated if they get past MAP. It does not make sense to create a
process that works best by not being used at all. Part of the success
of ICA is based on the independent arbitration board's decision that
can be a compromise between party positions. The nature of ITA
disputes in MAP clauses is different than a negotiable private deal
164. See all U.S. mandatory binding arbitration provisions (with the peculiarity
of Belgium: The U.S.-Belgium Tax Convention allows the board to decide more
than one issue, but "for each issue, [the board must] include only one of the two
proposed resolutions" (Arb. Board Operating Guidelines, paragraph 16, p. 5).
165. Schlaman & Trauman, supra note 37, at 2.
166. Dispute Resolution, supra note 163, at 2.
167. U.S.-Belgium Arbitration Board Operating Guidelines, U.S.-Belg., Nov. 27,
2009, paragraph 16, p. 5.
168. See U.S.-Germany Tax Convention, supra note 23; U.S.-Canada Diplomatic
Note, supra note 66; U.S.-France Memorandum, supra note 71.
169. Harrington, supra note 7, at 755.
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because ultimately just one country will have the right to tax;
however, if it were as easy as "choosing" one country, the
arbitration process would not be the correct forum. Based on all the
differences between ICA and ITA discussed above and the
confidentiality and enforcement issues discussed below, it would
seem like mediation would be more appropriate if the goal were to
get the arbitrators to agree.170 The decision to include mandatory,
binding arbitration clauses in MAP is an explicit rejection of less
compulsory mediation proceedings. As mandatory binding
arbitration moves ITA in the direction of ICA, baseball arbitration
will probably be replaced with discretionary decisions by the
arbitral board. At this point, taxpayer involvement, discovery, and
enforcement issues will become more significant.
There is no appeal process in mandatory binding arbitration
under MAP. The contracting states cannot appeal since they could
have reached a different agreement at any time and cancelled the
arbitration proceeding. The taxpayer cannot appeal, but he can
reject the arbitration decision.171 If an arbitration decision is rejected,
the issue cannot be re-submitted to MAP.172 Likewise, a party
cannot appeal an ICA decision, but can challenge the award in the
place of arbitration or in the country where enforcement is being
sought.173 This is an area where the development of ITA should
borrow from another area of law like ICA or ICSID.174
8. Confidentiality
Some may perceive ICA and ITA's emphasis on confidentiality
as contradictory to establishing a trusted, transparent, respected area
of law. In reality, confidentiality hinders none of those objectives. In
ICA, confidentiality of the arbitration proceedings is "one of the
fundamental principles - and one of the most definite advantages"
170. Mediation is "a non-binding procedure" where the "parties remain always
in control." The mediator's role "is to assist the parties in reaching their own
decision" and is a "confidential procedure." Mediation is "an interest-based
procedure, whereas arbitration is a rights-based procedure." VARADY ET AL., Supra
note 72, at 2-3.
171. See U.S.-France Memorandum, supra note 71; U.S.-Canada Diplomatic Note,
supra note 66; U.S. - Belgium Memorandum, supra note 39; U.S.-Germany Tax
Convention, supra note 23.
172. Id.
173. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 79, at art. V (2).
174. See infra, pp. 217-219.
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when compared to courtroom proceedings.175 Confidentiality allows
businesses to keep their dealings, trade secrets, or indiscretions
hidden. In ICA, confidentiality applies to both the arbitration
proceedings and the eventual award or decision if the parties
expressly agree to confidentiality.176
Similarly, confidentiality of the arbitration is expressly provided
for in all four U.S. mandatory binding arbitration provisions.'77
Neither the procedures, materials used, nor decision of the arbitration
board may be disclosed "except as permitted by the Convention and
the domestic laws of the Contracting States." 78 The U.S. conventions
with Germany, Canada, and France even provide for confidentiality
over a person who the taxpayer "has the legal authority to bind,"
such as a parent company and its subsidiary. 179 This convergence
with ICA methods is a good indication that taxpayers will submit
their tax issues to arbitration. The only improvement for ITA would
be to include taxpayers in the arbitration process. Emphasizing the
importance of confidentiality in both ICA and ITA, the ICC states "an
essential characteristic" of an arbitration clause is that "the highest
applicable standard [of confidentiality] should apply." 80
9. Enforcement of Arbitral Decisions
In ICA, "arbitral awards are usually final and binding, which
avoids a drawn-out appeals process." 81 Administrators of ICA
realized it would be a waste of time and resources if arbitral
decisions were easily overturned or disobeyed in the country where
the award is supposed to be enforced. To proactively address this
problem, almost all countries that are engaged in significant
international commerce signed on to the Convention on the
175. VARADY ET AL., supra note 72, at 340.
176. see Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank v. A.I. Trade Finance Inc., Supreme Court
of Sweden, October 27, 2000, as reproduced in VARADY, supra note 72, at 584 et. seq.
("the Supreme Court considers that a party in arbitration proceedings cannot be
deemed to be bound by a duty of confidentiality, unless the parties have concluded
an agreement concerning this").
177. See U.S.-France Memorandum, supra note 71; U.S.-Canada Diplomatic Note,
%supra note 66; U.S.-Belgium Memorandum, supra note 39; U.S.-Germany Tax
Convention, supra note 23.
178. U.S.-Germany Tax Convention, supra note 23, at art. XVI, paragraph 22(n).
179. See U.S.-Germany Tax Convention, supra note 23; U.S.-Canada Diplom atic
Note, supra note 66; U.S.-France Memorandum, supra note 71.
180. ICC, supra note 20, at 4.
181. Miccioli, supra note 74.
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Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the N.Y.
Convention). The N.Y. Convention contains procedures for setting
aside an award: (1) in the country where the arbitration award was
made; and (2) in the country where enforcement of the award is
sought.182
The first procedure has been the subject of debate and litigation
in ICA. Article 5(e) of the N.Y. Convention allows a country to
refuse to enforce an award if the award "has been set aside or
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or
under the law of which, that award was made." 83 The language "in
which" is the seat of arbitration, but the language "under the law of
which" could mean procedural or substantive law.84 This goes back
to potential choice of law problems that don't yet exist in ITA.
Article 5 of the N.Y. Convention contains exclusive reasons why
an award may be unenforceable "in the country where recognition
and enforcement is sought." 85 These reasons are limited to a subject
matter "not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of
that country," or where recognition "would be contrary to the
public policy of that country."186 Courts have interpreted these
exceptions narrowly, preserving the "binding" nature of arbitration
in ICA, and suggesting ITA decisions be binding as well.
In our four U.S. examples, arbitration decisions are "binding"
on the two contracting states, and thus represent a resolution of
MAP.187 The problem, however, is that each concerned party (the
taxpayer who brought the issue before his competent authority in
the first place) is free to accept or decline the resolution.188 Since the
taxpayer is generally not involved in the arbitration proceedings, it
seems unlikely that he will accept the resolution without question,
especially if the resolution is to his detriment. If the taxpayer does
not accept the resolution, the case cannot be resubmitted to MAP189
182. See N.Y. Convention, supra note 79, at art. V.
183. Id.
184. See International Standard Electric Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima
Petrolera p. 747 as reproduced in VARADY ET AL., supra note 72, at 747 et. seq.
185. N.Y. Convention, supra note 79, at art. V(2).
186. Id. at V (2)(a-b).
187. See U.S.-France Memorandum, supra note 71; U.S.-Canada Diplomatic Note,
supra note 66; U.S.-Belgium Memorandum, supra note 39; U.S.-Germany Tax
Convention, supra note 23.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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and remains unresolved, and the time and resources of all parties
who were involved are wasted.
The general attitude toward mandatory binding arbitration in
MAP is that it will never be used. But what happens if an issue does
go to arbitration? The law and procedure to enforce an ITA decision
is underdeveloped as a direct result of the view that arbitration
solves MAP. Examining ITA through the lens of ICA demonstrates
the importance of a decision being "binding" and "enforceable" in
accomplishing ITA's goals. Once again, the ICC recognizes this
error from its experience in ICA, and suggests that "arbitration
should be binding [on] the affected states as well as the affected
taxpayers."190
C. On Balance, Will the ICA Model Work for ITA?
Yes. The more established ICA process can provide useful
guidance for the development of ITA. ICA is popular because it
gives businesses flexibility and control when operating on a
multinational level. These companies are more likely to invest and
expand abroad if they know how potential disputes will be dealt
with. Instead of being subject to unfamiliar foreign courts, the
companies will submit to arbitration standards they themselves
have agreed upon. Similarly, "tax treaty arbitration meets the needs
of multinational corporate groups seeking symmetrical treatment of
income inclusions and deductions in different countries." 191
Taxpayers are likely to submit to arbitration when "litigation under
the court system or in administrative tribunals remains an available
but uncertain path,"192 because they will want a neutral and familiar
forum to determine their tax liability.
In fact, the need for familiarity and neutrality is heightened in
the international tax environment. In ICA, the parties are generally
private companies engaged in business. In ITA, the parties are
nations, represented by their competent authorities. In an ITA
situation, these national representatives meet to discuss one of the
countries' taxpayers, who had been subject to possible economic
double taxation as a result of his multinational activities. The
"multinational's position would be that of a stakeholder, willing to
190. ICC, supra note 20, at 4. (emphasis added).
191. PARK, supra note 86, at 182.
192. Dispute Resolution, supra note 163, at 4.
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pay tax to either [country], but not to both countries." 193 There is no
right or wrong way to reduce that taxpayer's double taxation, but
only more and less effective ways. 194 Arbitration based on the
following ICA model is the most effective because of its
development and success in the areas discussed above. Since ICA
via the "private sector was evidently influential in bringing
arbitration to tax treaties," it follows that we should look to ICA "if
we want to understand what arbitration is really about" and to learn
how to improve it.195
This view has support in both the tax and arbitration fields.
Manal Corwin, the Treasury Department Assistant Secretary of
International Tax Affairs told the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations that "based on our review of the U.S. experience with
arbitration in other areas of the law .. . and overwhelming support
of the business community, we concluded that mandatory binding
arbitration as the final step in the CA [competent authority] process
can be an effective and appropriate tool to facilitate mutual
agreement under U.S. treaties."196 The ICC issued a statement
"encourage[ing] governments to accept compulsory arbitration in
international tax conflicts ... based upon the broad experience of
ICC in commercial arbitration."197 The ICC believes that mandatory
binding arbitration accomplishes corresponding goals of the tax
system and ICA, including "not only the cost-effective and equitable
resolution of tax controversies, but also the enhancement of global
economic growth and development through elimination of
unintended instances of double taxation."'198 The ICC
"recommend[s] that compulsory and binding arbitration in
international tax matters should be adopted in bilateral or
multilateral tax conventions."199
193. PARK, supra note 86, at 182.
194. Harrington, supra note 7, at 761.
195. Christians, supra note 3, at 173.
196. See Opening Statement of Manal Corwin, Treasury Deputy Assistant
Secretary (International Tax Affairs), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June
7, 2011 at p. 7.
197. ICC, supra note 20, at 1.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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VI. Solution: Arbitration of Double Taxation Issues Should
be Modeled After the International Commercial
Arbitration System
A. The Success of the ICSID Arbitration Model Shows This is
Possible
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) arbitrates disputes between a state and a foreign investor
(usually a private party).200 ICSID is an "autonomous international
institution established under the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States." 201 The primary purpose of this multilateral international
treaty is to "provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration of
international investment disputes." 20 2 ICSID arbitration plays "an
important role in the field of international investment and economic
development," as demonstrated by its "large membership,
considerable caseload, and by the numerous references to its
arbitration facilities in investment treaties and laws." 2 03
As a form of state - party arbitration, ICSID falls in the middle
of the continuum of private party - private party arbitration (ICA) to
state - state arbitrations (ITA). ICSID's popularity and success as a
dispute resolution institution shows the possibility of state - state
arbitration development independent of MAP, with input from the
private party taxpayer.
In many cases, ICSID arbitration is effectively mandatory and
binding. Arbitration under ICSID is technically voluntary, but if
both the investor and the country where he invests consent, then
arbitration "cannot be withdrawn unilaterally and it becomes a
binding undertaking." 204 "Consent" in many ICSID cases is more
mandatory than it seems. The basis of consent is usually found in
bilateral or multilateral treaties between governments, or in
200. Background Information on the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) 1, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
ICSID/ICSIDOverview.jsp (last visited Dec. 17, 2012).
201. ICSID Background Information, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ Ind
ex.jsp (last visited Dec. 17, 2012).
202. Id.
203. About ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?request
Type=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pageName=AboutCSIDHome.
204 Background Information, supra note 201, at 1.
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investment contracts between the investor and the host state, all of
which are agreed upon in advance of disputes.205 These agreements
play a similar role to tax conventions; they both provide a basis for
mandatory binding arbitration in ICSID and ITA. ICSID decisions
are binding unless a party requests annulment and a new arbitral
panel annuls all or part of the award based on limited grounds.206
ICSID arbitration mirrors the success of ICA in the categories
discussed above, which is why independent investors and states
trust its process. ICSID is an "independent international institution"
that provides a "neutral facility" and "independent arbitrators."207
Parties to ICSID "allow the investor to select the applicable
procedural rules," which can come from ICSID or "other arbitration
rules" like UNCITRAL. 208 ICSID cases are decided "on the basis of
facts and law presented by each of the parties." 209 As ITA develops
as its own field, it can use ICSID standards as gap-fillers when ICA
principles are not well suited to the public sphere.
B. The U.S. Tax Conventions Should Be Updated
The U.S. Model Tax Convention, as it stands, does not have an
arbitration provision under MAP. Although U.S. tax conventions
generally conform to the U.S. Model Tax Convention, "each tax
treaty is negotiated separately in order to address issues that arise
from specific interaction of the two countries." 210 The United States
should follow the lead of the OECD, which "frequently updates the
OECD Model Treaty in response to the evolution of the global
economy and the effect on taxation." 211
How can the U.S. conventions incorporate mandatory binding
arbitration provisions? One proposed solution is for the "U.S.
treaties [to contain] a provision that automatically updates the treaty
when the OECD makes changes to the OECD Model Treaty" since
the "U.S. Model Treaty incorporates many aspects of the OECD
205. See id. at 2 (Bilateral Investment Treaties contain the basis of consent in 63%
of ICSID cases).
206. See ICSID Convention, Regulations, and Rules, April 2006, art. 52.
207. See Background Information, supra note 201 at 1, 2.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 3.
210. Kirsch, supra note 5, at 1066.
211. Bertolini & Weaver, supra note 6, at 17.
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Model Treaty" already.212 The United States wouldn't be giving up
all control because "as a member of the OECD, the United States
participates in the development of the OECD model."213
Nevertheless, "given the political and economic importance of tax
policy, it is highly unlikely that the United States would agree that
future modifications to the OECD Model Treaty would be binding
with respect to existing U.S. bilateral tax treaties." 214 If this raises a
sovereignty concern, the treaties could automatically update only
when the U.S. Model Tax Convention is amended, since that would
let the U.S. government retain power.
The decision to "update," however, would have to be agreed
upon in advance in each treaty, resulting in renegotiations of every
treaty. To "update the entire U.S. treaty network in this manner, the
Treasury Department would have to renegotiate more than sixty
separate treaties - a daunting and time-consuming task."215
Alternatively, Congress could enact "legislation overriding
particular provisions of tax treaties, a step that constitutes a
violation of the United States' obligations under the treaties and,
accordingly, is generally discouraged by [the] Treasury
Department." 216
Does the development of ITA have to be in the context of MAP?
What if the mandatory binding arbitration provision existed in an
independent provision? MAP is already an obscure process, so
"when arbitration is added in to [sic] this context. .. the picture of
decision-making and clarity of tax law becomes ever murkier." 217
Instead, taxpayers could choose between going to their competent
authorities (and therefore MAP) or going straight to arbitration.
This might also raise sovereignty issues because "a country should
not delegate inherently governmental functions, or cannot do so
under its domestic legal rules." 218 However, "nations may enter into
mutual alliances without experiencing a loss of sovereignty,
especially when the signatories have equivalent rights under the
212. Id. at 18.
213. Christians, supra note 3, at 175.
214. Kirsch, supra note 5, at 1067.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Christians, supra note 3, at 180.
218. DuRsT & CULBERTSON, supra note 12, at 3.
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treaty." 219 Another concern nations may have is that this would
move taxation, an integral source of government revenue, into the
private sector because arbitration would no longer go through
competent authorities. This is a policy debate where governments
are probably unwilling to be flexible.
VII. Conclusion
Instead of looking at ITA in the context of "fixing" MAP, it is
more useful to consider how the progress of ICA can be used as a
template. In the many successful arbitrations under ICA and ICSID,
"arbitrators routinely address problems of taxation in the context of
ordinary commercial contracts as well as claims by foreign investors
brought against host states." 220 It follows that arbitration of taxation
issues is feasible and efficient, and will be as commonly utilized as
arbitration in commercial and investment matters.
The four U.S. tax conventions that include mandatory binding
arbitration provisions demonstrate how ITA already incorporates
ICA standards, and where it has room for improvement. Specifically,
there is a need for more taxpayer involvement in the ITA process.
The United States is moving towards including mandatory binding
arbitration clauses in future tax conventions, 221 but should also
include clauses allowing taxpayers to be the "third party" in
arbitrations.
For the reasons discussed above, ITA would be more effective at
resolving double taxation disputes in a three-party system with input
from both contracting states and the dissatisfied taxpayer.
219. Covington, supra note 8, at 370.
220. PARK, supra note 86, at 180.
221. "A proposed Swiss protocol, which has been approved by the U.S. Senate
Foreign Relations Conmmittee but must now be voted on by the full Senate, also
contains this clause. In addition, the United States is in the process of negotiating
amendments to its income tax treaty with Japan and there has been speculation that
a mandatory binding arbitration procedure will be included." Dispute Resolution,
supra note 163.
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